Local Enforcemtn of Foreign National Judgments—A New Standard by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 4 
10-1-1965 
Local Enforcemtn of Foreign National Judgments—A New 
Standard 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Local Enforcemtn of Foreign National Judgments—A New Standard, 40 
Wash. L. Rev. 911 (1965). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol40/iss4/12 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONAL
JUDGMENTS-A NEW STANDARD
Defendant, a resident of the District of Columbia, borrowed money
from plaintiff, a Canadian resident, and secured the loan with a mort-
gage on a tract of land located in Ontario. The mortgage was executed
in the District of Columbia and contained a clause by which defendant
assented to jurisdiction of Ontario courts by substituted service in the
event litigation became necessary. Plaintiff, upon defendant's default,
sought foreclosure of the mortgage and a judgment in Ontario. Pur-
suant to Ontario statute,1 defendant was personally served in the Dis-
trict of Columbia with a writ and notice of the Ontario proceedings.
Defendant failed to appear, and the Ontario court entered default
judgment. Plaintiff then sued in the District of Columbia to enforce
the Ontario judgment. Defendant contended that the Ontario court
had lacked jurisdiction to render an in personam judgment. On cross
motions for summary judgment, held: The personal jurisdiction of a
foreign court, which satisfies the law of that nation, will be recognized
in the District of Columbia if the facts upon which jurisdiction was
based satisfy the minimum requirements of constitutional due process.
Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964).
No international law exists as to the conditions under which a nation
should give effect to the judgment of a foreign court,' nor has the
United States a treaty controlling the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. The Constitution does not expressly refer to disposition of such
judgments, although the minimum standards of due process apply to
foreign' as well as domestic judgments. No District of Columbia
I Rule 25 (1) (b) of the Consolidated Rules of Practice of Ontario (1947) pro-
vides: "25-(1) Service out of Ontario of a writ of summons or notice of writ may be
allowed... (b) Where any act, deed, will, contract, obligation or liability affecting land
or hereditaments, situate within Ontario, is sought to be construed, rectified, set aside
or enforced."2 See Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on International Jurisdiction, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 5, 23 (1964) : "At present each nation is at liberty to determine not only
the limits upon the exercise of jurisdiction by its own courts, but also the range of
jurisdiction which it is willing to concede to foreign states." [This article will consti-
tute section 1 of chapter 2 of the author's forthcoming treatise, Jurisdiction and Judg-
ments: A Comparative Study, to be published for the Parker School of Foreign and
Comparative Law, Columbia University, by Oceana Publications, Inc.] cf. Draft of
Convention adopted by the Special Commission in the matter of Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments, Session of Feb. 26, 1963, Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law.
3 Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D.Ohio 1951).
4 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
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statute relates to the enforcement of foreign judgments.' The United
States Supreme Court, in Hilton v. Guyot,6 had laid down without dis-
cussion a requirement of "jurisdiction" in a "competent [foreign]
court" for the enforcement of a judgment of that foreign court. The
only Supreme Court case dealing with the quality of the foreign juris-
diction denied enforcement of the judgment,8 but recent liberalization
of the jurisdictional requirement of due process presented the court
in the principal case with a basis for reaching a contrary result.
The court in the principal case considered the only issue to be
whether the Ontario court had the personal jurisdiction over the
defendant necessary to render an in personam judgment. The court
first noted that Ontario law authorized personal jurisdiction over the
defendant based upon substituted service outside of Ontario.' The
court then stated that it was necessary to determine whether the law
of the United States or of Canada should govern the ultimate issue of
whether the Ontario court had the requisite personal jurisdiction.
Deciding in favor of United States law, the court held the proper
jurisdictional standard applicable to a foreign judgment to be the
due process standard promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"0 McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co.," and Hanson v. Denckla.'2 The court con-
sidered these cases in detail, and concluded that the defendant had
sufficient "contact" with the jurisdiction of the Ontario court to give
that court personal jurisdiction over him.'"
The court's statement that it must determine whether the law of
the United States or Canada should govern the ultimate decision is
misleading, for the court had already decided that the Ontario court
had authority under Ontario law to render the in personam judgment.
This preliminary consideration of the foreign law indicates that the
5 California is the only state which has a statute concerning the enforcement of
foreign judgments. CAL. CODE Civ. P. § 1915 states: "A final judgment of any other
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction, according to the laws of such country,
to pronounce the judgment, shall have the same effect as in the country where rendered;
and also the same effect as final judgments rendered in this state." No state has yet
adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
6 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
7 Id. at 205.
8 Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
9 Rule 25(1) (b) of the Consolidated Rules of Practice of Ontario, supra note 1;
McMahon v. Waskochil, Ont. Weekly N. 887 (1945).
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1L 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
12 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
'. It should be noted that defendant's assent in the terms of the mortgage contract
to substituted service gave the court an alternative ground for the decision.
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court in the principal case must have considered it essential that the
jurisdiction of the judgment court be valid according to the applicable
foreign law. The correct statement of the issue as seen by the court,
then, was whether the jurisdiction must satisfy United States as well
as foreign jurisdictional standards.
Although the Supreme Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot is primarily
noted and criticized for its reciprocity requirement,"4 the case is rec-
ognized as a landmark for its prescription of the general conditions
under which a foreign judgment should be given conclusive effect:
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a
foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of
money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the defendant
to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered
by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties,
and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against
them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized
jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgmeit
is prinm facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and
it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court,
unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as
by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the
principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it
should not be given full credit and effect.15
The only case in which the Court examined the basis of the juris-
diction of a foreign court was handed down in 1869,1" and the then
current common law standards for in personam jurisdiction were not
satisfied by the extra-territorial personal service which occurred in
that case. Extensive research has failed to uncover a decision in which
any court in the United States has enforced a judgment of a court of
a foreign nation based upon jurisdiction acquired by extra-territorial
service.
The principal case is the first to weigh the effect of the minimum
contacts test on the recognition of foreign judgments. Since the due
process clause of the Constitution establishes only a minimum juris-
dictional standard, courts of the various jurisdictions within the
United States are free to apply any jurisdictional standard which
does not violate due process. Relying upon the minimum contacts
test, some jurisdictions have extended the scope of their jurisdiction
14 SeReese, The Status in this Country of' Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLumL.
L. REv. 783 (1950) ; Student Analysis, 7he Enforceability of Foreign Judgments in
American C'ourts, 37 No=R DAiez LAW. 88 (1961).
15159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895)
1 0 Bishoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
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by statute." Other courts, without the aid of statute, have extended
their jurisdiction to the "limits of due process."' 8 Finally, some juris-
dictions, including the District of Columbia, still retain the "physical
power" concept of Pennoyer v. Neff."
The applicable District of Columbia statute provides that an action
may not be brought in the District against a person who is not a
resident of nor found within the District. Therefore, if the situa-
tion in the principal case were reversed, the District court would not
have had jurisdiction over the absentee mortgagor. With such a
restrictive local law, the court in the principal case could be expected
to apply the local jurisdictional standard of the District of Columbia.
But the court did not consider the jurisdictional standard of the Dis-
trict. In effect, the court decided that the local standard was irrelevant;
the only relevant standard was the minimum standard of constitu-
tional due process. The choice of due process was the most liberal posi-
tion available to the court."
The decision of the court in the principal case increases the possi-
bility of recovery of judgments of foreign nations. With the modern
development of rapid communications and international trade and
travel, the law must improve the effectiveness of legal efforts to settle
controversies arising from international transactions. If a stricter
standard than minimum constitutional due process is required for the
jurisdiction of foreign courts, the effectiveness of those legal efforts
will be impaired, particularly when the evidence would be located
abroad or the law to be applied would be that of the foreign nation. By
improving the opportunity for effective international relief, the decision
in the principal case promotes international trade.
Adoption by the court in the principal case of the minimum constitu-
tional standard for determining enforceability of foreign judgments is
also desirable for its value as precedent. This decision could be the
' See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1963) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.28.180-185
(1959).
"I See, e.g., Northern Supply, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 397 P.2d 1013 (Alaska
1965) ; Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Calif., 40 Cal. Rptr. 833, 230 Cal.
App. 2d 348 (1964).
19 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
20 D.C. CODE § 11-521 (Supp. III, 1964).
21 Cf. Courts of the British Commonwealth enforce foreign judgments on a basis of
obligation instead of a basis of comity. As a result, even though the various units of
the Commonwealth have extended the jurisdiction of their own courts by statute, each
unit judges judgements from foreign countries and from other units of the Common-
wealth by the strict common law standards. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 627-53 (6th ed. 1961); READ, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN THE CommoN LAW UNITS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, (1938).
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first step in establishing a uniform national standard for enforcement
of foreign judgments. 2 Such uniformity is desirable, as the present
system (by which local jurisdictional standards are determinative)
means that the enforceability of a foreign judgment in the United
States varies with the location of each defendant. 8 The decision in the
principal case is of only persuasive force outside the District of
Columbia, as each state may choose a standard stricter than minimum
contacts for application to foreign judgments without violating due
process. The present condition of diversity also suggests the desir-
ability of a treaty or series of treaties dealing with the enforceability
of foreign judgments. Besides achieving uniformity in the United
States, such treaties would improve the rights of United States citizens
with local judgments against foreign nationals. 4
22 See note 5 supra.
23 See discussion in Campbell, Jurisdiction over Absent Defendants in English and
United States Law, 38 TuL. L. REv. 317 (1964).
24 See Nadelman, Reprisals Against Anzerican Judgments, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1184,
1194 (1952).
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